

Global Solidarity Scorecard

Methodology Note

September 2024

Global Nation is a think-/do-tank promoting an internationalist future. Founded in 2022, its mission is to strengthen international cooperation to tackle humanity's greatest challenges and create a thriving, fairer world.

This note presents the methodology used to build the annual Global Solidarity Scorecard produced by Global Nation since 2023. It outlines the goals of the Scorecard, its theoretical framework, the approach taken, and the list of indicators drawn up to represent global solidarity.

The Scorecard is the backbone of the Global Solidarity Report, first published in September 2023, to assess the state of global solidarity in a rigorous way. The report is intended to be media-friendly, fact-based content including original public opinion data. It highlights “calls to action” that can meaningfully improve cooperation in the short term, as well as encouraging more debate about the long-term future of multilateralism.

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Goals of the Global Solidarity Report and Scorecard

The debate on how well the international community is doing is more often grounded in anecdote than data and evidence. Given the far greater salience of punchy bad news stories over incremental successes, there is a risk that an overly pessimistic consensus emerges. The Global Solidarity Report launches a more balanced yardstick for how the world is doing, a stronger narrative of global solidarity and community.

Greater solidarity between countries and peoples is the only way we will solve the many crises that cross borders, whether climate change, pandemics, existential technological threats, or the resettlement of refugees. It also offers the hope for a kinder, more prosperous, more equal, and more stable world.

The backbone of this new report is a Scorecard assessing the state of global solidarity, including original global public opinion data measuring attitudes towards cooperation. It offers a fact-based, easy-to-understand system for determining the state of global solidarity—a stronger basis for discussion about ways to improve it. Such a product feeds into a rich seam of ongoing debate; in other words, it meets many audiences where they already are—wondering about the overall shape of the international community during a period of multiple crises and geopolitical flux.

The connection between solidarity and solving global problems is both obvious and devilishly complex. We cannot foresee with precision what the future holds. The best we can do is to make informed judgments, based on experience and expertise, as to what needs to happen if we are to achieve progress in the 21st century.

Definition of solidarity and cooperation

Solidarity is the basis of community—whether local, national, or international. When we have a sense of belonging together, effective and representative institutions, and powerful stories that show cooperation working, the sacrifices that are needed to solve common challenges become possible. Without that solidarity, it will be much harder to make tough choices and fix crises.

The core premises underlying this Scorecard are that global solidarity and community underpin global cooperation, and that global cooperation is at the centre of achieving a more sustainable, equitable, and thriving world. With more—and better—global cooperation, year on year, decade on decade, net progress is possible.

Solidarity has three underlying drivers: Identities, Institutions, and Impacts. These three drivers work in a cycle, which can be positive or negative. Strong group identities produce stronger institutions, and these can lead to more impacts, reinforcing solidarity over time. But if one of the three drivers weakens, it can in turn weaken the others, sending solidarity into decline.

Inclusivity, dignity, and representativeness are key to real solidarity. This lens has been applied to the development of drivers and indicators in this Scorecard. In scope the relations between states, citizens, intergovernmental organisations and multilateral development banks, private sector entities, and civil society, which collectively work towards achieving joint objectives.

This Scorecard's theoretical framework is inspired by theories of sustainable development, international relations, and psychology. It looks to social psychology's explanation of cooperation: it "is defined as extending a benefit b to others at a cost c to oneself, with $c < b$. From an evolutionary perspective, a cooperator increases their fitness when cooperation is reciprocated, because the received benefit b exceeds the cost c incurred when initiating cooperation."¹

Measuring solidarity

Global solidarity is driven by Identities, Institutions, and Impacts. For these drivers, a set of eleven indicators was identified after a careful process of research, validation, and consultation. These indicators have been selected because they are powerful in providing relevant evidence, simple to understand, available in public data sources, and recent (covering the last 12 to 18 months). They highlight some of the most important success factors in the difficult task of effectively measuring global solidarity.

No set of indicators is perfect, and this selection is no exception. It is important to remember that indicators are just that—they provide an indication. They are not perfect answers to the questions we ultimately want to answer, which can be much broader in scope than the indicators, but they provide powerful indications which help us to answer them, through analysis.

Across the indicators, attempts were made to include representation from a variety of regions, types of cooperation, income levels, and power standings. Nevertheless, this new Scorecard is affected by the challenges and limitations of our current systems and data collection practices, which have often resulted in a disproportionate focus on the global North at the expense of the global South, in the literature and in existing indices. Despite efforts to overcome these limitations, there are still significant gaps in our understanding of the manifestations of cooperation, particularly in regions whose practices have not been classified as traditional development assistance, or in instances where data is not available or collected regularly. While the Scorecard aims to offer a more nuanced view of global cooperation, there remains work to be done to redress these imbalances and data gaps.

This methodology seeks to develop and codify a sound theoretical description of global solidarity, but it is limited by the availability of data. For data to be considered available for these purposes, not only must there be a reliable source collecting it annually and on a clearly measurable scale, but there must also be the assurance that it will continue to be collected on an annual basis for this Scorecard to continue to be released every year.

Identification of bounds and scoring calculation

This Scorecard establishes a benchmark against which to assess the state of global solidarity. The assumption is that if the benchmark is reached, global solidarity is successful. For each indicator, this forms the upper end of the bound ‘goalposts.’ On the other end, the lower bound represents a catastrophic failure of solidarity, jeopardising the global community.

In so doing, each indicator’s bounds rescale the actual values into a score, plotted between 0 and 100 (noting there are instances that fall ‘off the charts’). These scores can then be weighted and aggregated into the single composite score outlined under Building a single global score.

This approach to goalpost-setting has been designed to provide a realistic, meaningful range within which each year’s data points can be scored. In addition to setting a benchmark for global solidarity, these bounds consider previous trends to assess the standing of each indicator.

A four-step process was followed to identify these goalposts:

1. Does historical data reveal a trend, where change is hard-earned over time, such as the proportion of infants vaccinated with DTP3, or are year-on-year values highly scattered, suggesting high sensitivity to extrinsic changes, as in deaths in violent conflict?
2. What do historical bounds (i.e., best and worst years on record) and datapoint spread look like?
3. What is our aspiration for each of the four scorecard zones (from Breaking Point to Shared Purpose), including based on consultations with experts?
4. What is a reasonable range for lower and upper bounds, such that progress will be perceptible on an annual basis?

With bounds identified, each indicator is given a score out of 100 with the following calculation:

$$\text{Indicator score} = (\text{Actual value minus Lower bound} / \text{Upper bound minus Lower bound}) * 100$$

Building a single global score

Unlike many indices, this Scorecard does not rank countries. As important as nation-states are as bundles of sovereignty, identity, and power, they are not the only way in which to think of the world. In fact, listing countries on an index as if they are comparable to each other can be quite odd. China has around fourteen thousand times more people than the Seychelles. (If all countries were the size of the Seychelles, there would be tens of thousands of countries in the world; if they were the size of China, there would be just six.)

A community is best measured not by ranking its component parts against each other, but by reviewing its performance as a whole. Do you measure how strong a sports team is by gauging how each player performs individually, or measure your organisation's performance by reviewing how each individual employee is doing? No. You look at the performance of the group. Is there a good team spirit and a common purpose? Is the team well organised? Is it achieving its goals? The Global Solidarity Report asks these questions of the global community.

Inspiration was drawn from others in doing so. The Stockholm Resilience Centre devised Planetary Boundaries beyond which harm to the planet is not reversible. The Multilateralism Index by the International Peace Institute and the Institute for Economics and Peace examines not national governments, but the multilateral functions that we have established. Like them, the Global Solidarity Scorecard gauges how we are doing, as a global community.

How the score is calculated

Each of the 11 indicators was plotted on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 representing a complete failure of solidarity, and 100 representing a level of global solidarity strong enough to ensure humanity thrives in the 21st century. Each driver was then given a score using averages of their respective indicators. Finally, those driver aggregate scores were averaged to give an overall Global Solidarity Score.

This final score can sit in one of four categories:

- 75 to 100: "Shared Purpose," reflecting the high levels of global solidarity we need to solve our collective action problems
- 50 to 74: "Green Shoots," where levels of solidarity set us on a hopeful, albeit precarious path to tackling shared challenges
- 25 to 49: "Danger Zone," reflecting worryingly low levels of solidarity that threaten to make international crises far worse
- 0 to 24: "Breaking Point," a catastrophic failure of solidarity that risks creating a tailspin towards the breakdown of international society, with tragic outcomes for people and planet

Each of the drivers was weighted equally, even though Identities had fewer indicators (three) than the other two drivers (four each). This is demonstrated in the table below. Ultimately, the weighting and scaling (from 0 to 1) of the different variables can only be subjective, as is the interpretation of what they mean.

| | | Weight applied to calculate Driver score | Weight applied to calculate Scorecard score |
|--------------|--------------|--|---|
| Identity | Indicator 1a | 1/3 | 1/3 |
| | Indicator 1b | 1/3 | |
| | Indicator 1c | 1/3 | |
| | Total | 1 | |
| Institutions | Indicator 2a | 1/4 | 1/3 |
| | Indicator 2b | 1/4 | |
| | Indicator 2c | 1/4 | |
| | Indicator 2d | 1/4 | |
| | Total | 1 | |

| | | | |
|---------|--------------|-----|-----|
| Impacts | Indicator 3a | 1/4 | 1/3 |
| | Indicator 3b | 1/4 | |
| | Indicator 3c | 1/4 | |
| | Indicator 3d | 1/4 | |
| | Total | 1 | |
| Total | | | 1 |

Identities

To effectively solve collective action problems, individuals must feel part of a group, and must have sufficient trust in it to take individual losses for the good of all and submit to the enforcement of rules.ⁱⁱ Humans can have many overlapping identities, from geographical, to ethnic, to gender, and many others.ⁱⁱⁱ To give insights on global identities, public opinion data was commissioned from Ipsos via their well established Global Advisor survey covering 21,023 adults across 31 countries.

Although psychologists, politicians, and anyone running a business have always known how important they are for solidarity, Identities are an under-appreciated element of international affairs. Traditionally, the field of international relations paid little attention to public opinion, although this is now starting to change.^{iv} What was always true is now becoming clearer to political scientists; the fundamental audience for all governments (and not only democratic ones) is the same for international affairs as for domestic affairs: their own citizens. Although the remoteness of international affairs from their citizens' day-to-day lives means that governments can often act in the international arena with limited public scrutiny, public opinion nevertheless sets out the limits of the playing field for these activities. In the past, some countries' citizens permitted or even encouraged their governments to colonise and enslave foreigners. Today, few governments could get away with such an approach, but they may be able to justify a range of uncollaborative practices. Without further step changes in what the public will tolerate and support, a radical increase in international cooperation is unlikely to materialise.

The first part of the three-part framework for measuring global collaboration—Identities—is measured through original public attitudes data.

Identities indicators

Source for Identities indicators

The survey was carried out by Ipsos between 19 April and 3 May 2024 via their Global Advisor online platform.

They covered 31 countries; 12 lower and upper middle-income countries (LMICs and UMICs) and 19 high-income countries (HICs) covering around 53% of the global population. Surveyed countries were:

- Argentina
- Australia
- Belgium
- Brazil
- Canada
- China
- Chile
- Colombia
- France
- Germany
- Hungary
- India

- Indonesia
- Ireland
- Italy
- Japan
- Malaysia
- Mexico
- Netherlands
- Peru
- Poland
- Saudi Arabia
- Singapore
- South Africa
- South Korea
- Spain
- Sweden
- Thailand
- Türkiye (Turkey)
- United Kingdom
- United States of America

Ipsos interviewed a total of 21,023 adults aged 18 years and older in India, 18-74 in Canada, Republic of Ireland, Malaysia, South Africa, Turkey, and the United States, 20-74 in Thailand, 21-74 in Indonesia and Singapore, and 16-74 in all other countries.

The sample consists of approximately 1,000 individuals each in Australia, Brazil, Canada, mainland China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the U.S., and 500 individuals each in Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Thailand, and Turkey.

Samples in Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and the U.S. can be considered representative of their general adult populations under the age of 75. Samples in Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey are more urban, more educated, and/or more affluent than the general population. The survey results for these countries should be viewed as reflecting the views of the more “connected” segment of their population.

Data processing for Identities indicators

Global Nation aggregated the surveyed countries into High Income (HIC) and Low/Middle Income (LMIC) and attributed a weight to both groups based on their share of the total population of those 31 countries. Once processed, HIC respondents contribute 23.30% to the 31-country weighted average, while LMIC respondents contribute 76.70%.

Bounds for Identities indicators

To convert these weighted agreement rates into a score, a combination of historical analysis and aspirational norm-setting was applied to build the bounds for these three indicators. The historical analysis looked at the range of responses to these questions, where available in previous similar surveys. The aspirational norm-setting considered the proportion of respondents that would be required to have strong, versus weak, global solidarity. Further, in 2024, due to the polling data being subject to a different methodology than in 2023 when a different polling company conducted the survey, the bounds were slightly adjusted to reflect this. We were able to compare variations between responses to one of the questions that was asked in the same year – 2024 – by both companies to test the scale of variation caused by methodology alone.

The following bounds were selected and applied:

| Lower bound (Very weak global solidarity) | Upper bound (Very strong global solidarity) |
|---|---|
| 16% | 66% |

Caveats & mitigation

With all global surveys, there is a range of constraints to achieving representative polling numbers. The two most relevant to this assessment of global solidarity are:

1. The number and type of countries surveyed
2. The method of survey which skews towards people with internet access

It would be preferable to survey more countries, covering a greater proportion of the population, and in particular to include more countries in under-represented continents, particularly Africa, and under-represented income categories, particularly low-income countries. The selection of countries surveyed was limited by the prohibitive expense of expanding the list of countries given available budget.

To mitigate the first of these problems, the weighting outlined above was applied to the polling data to reflect the fact that the LMICs surveyed were significantly more populous than the HICs. The grouping of countries into income categories and weighting responses on this basis was a decision that was designed to carefully balance the need to mitigate against high-income country bias with the need to avoid individual countries with less reliable data having too much influence. If each country's score had been weighted by the population of the individual country, this would have given the results for China and India a dominating influence on the overall score, while results from these countries are among the least reliable due to the difficulty in gathering representative data from them. Therefore the weighting of high-income scores versus middle-income scores according to global high-income versus non-high-income populations was chosen as a middle ground that removed high-income bias without over-weighting towards two very large middle-income countries.

These constraints will diminish in significance as trend data is collected over the next few years using the same methodology.

Indicator 1a FEELING OF BELONGING

Research question

Do people feel like world citizens?

Data point

Proportion of respondents responding either "Agree" or "Strongly agree" to the statement, "I consider myself more a world citizen than a citizen of the country I live in," averaged and weighted

Rationale

A shared group identity is central to solidarity and is the fundamental tool for solving collective action problems: we can put aside our selfish interests only when we feel that we are part of something bigger.^v This question has a "strong" formulation, as it asks people if they feel more like citizens of the world than of their own country. Identity is not an "either... or..." Identities are built on top of each other like layers. This is evidenced by survey data from ISSP which shows that people who agree with this statement on global citizenship typically also feel very proud of their country.^{vi}

The reason for the strong formulation is to ensure that it captures those who truly feel committed to internationalism. For this reason, the same formulation has been used in a large number of surveys in the past, which means this 2023 data can be compared with historical levels of agreement with the same statement.

Historical Minimum and Maximum Values

This survey question has been asked by Glocalities seven times since 2014 prior to this year's research programme. The Glocalities research programme builds on the Mentality research programme in the

Netherlands from Motivaction (sister company of Glocalities), where the survey question had been included in fieldwork waves since 1997. This question has also been researched by Globescan since 2011, and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) since 1995.^{vii}

However, aggregation methods and countries in scope differ, such that comparability between research agencies is not reliable. As such, the Global Solidarity Scorecard exclusively references Glocalities 2023 data.

Indicator 1b WILLINGNESS TO PAY TAXES

Research question

Are people willing to incur costs to help solve global problems?

Data point

Proportion of respondents responding either “Agree” or “Strongly agree” to the statement, “My taxes should go toward solving global problems,” averaged and weighted

Rationale

This question is designed to test how meaningful the “world citizen” identity measured in the previous question really is. For a group of humans to solve collective action problems, requires its members to make sacrifices for the good of the group.^{viii} The most measurable and consistent sacrifice that political groups require of their members is paying tax. Are people willing for their taxes to solve global problems or do they insist that someone else picks up the bill?

Historical Minimum and Maximum Values

This survey question was asked by Glocalities for the first time in 2023. The question was identified in collaboration with Global Nation for this study. No trends or historical reference points are available.

Indicator 1c SUPPORT FOR ENFORCEMENT

Research question

How much power do people think global bodies should have?

Data point

Proportion of respondents responding either “Agree” or “Strongly agree” to the statement, “For certain problems, like environmental pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions,” averaged and weighted

Rationale

This third question also tests how meaningful global citizenship really is. In addition to making individual sacrifices for the good of the group, the other fundamental requirement of citizens is that they agree to rules being made, and enforced, collectively.^{ix} This question tests not only whether people think that countries should be compelled to live up to their obligations to protect the planet, but also the level of trust that people have that such enforcement can be achieved by international organisations.

Historical Minimum and Maximum Values

This survey question was introduced into Glocalities’ research programme in 2023 as part of its collaboration with Global Nation. It builds on research on this question by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) since 1995.^x

However, aggregation methods and countries in scope differ, such that comparability between research agencies is not reliable. As such, the Global Solidarity Scorecard exclusively references Glocalities’ 2023 data.

Institutions

If identities provide the bedrock of solidarity, then institutions provide the vehicles for making cooperation happen.^{xi} Institutions are mechanisms that encourage and regulate cooperation. In a household, these could be as informal as a verbal agreement on who washes the dishes. For more complex forms of cooperation, more formal institutions are required. Are international institutions, agreements, and protocols functioning well, and how they are evolving?

Measuring institutional effectiveness is complicated. McKinsey & Company's Organizational Health Index measures 37 different management practices through an extensive and costly survey process, to create an indexed score that allows clients to compare their organisation's effectiveness to a set of historical respondents. It has not been possible to approach this level of complexity in the analysis of international organisations in our Scorecard. However, particularly with regards to measuring institutional effectiveness within the context of international cooperation, the indicators selected stand out as being powerful measures of whether the success factors are in place.

Inter-governmental organisations play a particularly important role in the Scorecard because they are the only organisations that are legally mandated to strengthen international cooperation; they are widely recognised as being necessary and irreplaceable for the success of international cooperation (notwithstanding the benefits of positive contributions from other actors), and they offer us a relatively stable, manageable and measurable set of institutions on which to gather data in a reliable and regular manner.

Funding and decision-making are important in any organisation, but particularly so in IGOs, because they represent the two biggest barriers to improved performance. They are the two factors that rely most on pro-collaborative behaviours by national governments. Funding intergovernmental organisations requires countries paying a national-level financial cost for the purpose of common regional or global benefits. Reaching agreement and taking decisions within intergovernmental organisations requires countries sacrificing some of their narrower interests in order to find compromise and consensus, again for the purpose of common regional or global benefits.

However, national institutions matter a great deal as well and are often the primary influences on global decisions. In the 21st century it is expected that decision-making bodies at all levels should reflect the nature of the societies over which they have power. Furthermore, more representative institutions are likely to make better decisions.

Non-governmental interactions are also important. While official decision-making processes are crucial for global solidarity and community, countries and people engage globally in many other, often less formal ways. Cultural and economic ties are critical parts of the global solidarity web. Despite the critical role in international affairs of governments and the multilateral organisations they have created, most cross-border interactions are through private individuals and companies. Each of them requires some level of trust and cooperation.

The four indicators for this driver reflect these various aspects of institutional strength and effectiveness, look at the level of funding that global and regional intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) receive, the extent to which their governing bodies can reach agreement and take decisions, the level of representivity in national governments, and the level of international trade.

Clearly there are many aspects that cannot be measured with a small set of indicators. But progress in other areas should impact the indicators chosen. For instance, if civil society is active and impactful, more women will be represented in national parliaments; if national governments seek to open borders, more businesses will sell their goods and services internationally, increasing trade and interdependence. The Global Solidarity Report's calls to action draw attention to the need for strengthened institutions, ranging from funding to a Pandemic Accord to creating enabling environments for stakeholders to keep oil in the ground.

Indicator 2a MULTILATERAL FUNDING

Research question

Are global institutions tasked with responding to global challenges being funded sufficiently to do their job?

Data point

Proportion of donor countries' total economy, measured in the Gross National Income (GNI) of members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), that is dedicated to supporting multilateral organisations

Rationale

For the global community to operate well and achieve impact it requires well-functioning institutions, and these in turn require adequate funding. Money is not the only determinant of impact, but it is a *sine qua non*. This indicator measures the extent to which the survey question, "My taxes should go toward solving global problems," is being put into practice by governments. While bilateral spending is also of great value, it is more obviously related to the specific interests of contributor (and to some extent recipient) nations and is therefore a weaker measure of global solidarity than spending directed to or via multilateral organisations.

It was decided to focus on government contributions rather than private contributions because governments are the legitimate representatives of their peoples in international fora. While private funding is also of value, it can to some extent be considered a substitute for inadequate funding from governments.

The ideal scenario here would be to have data from all countries in the world on their contributions to all multilateral organisations, including global funds. Of course, perfect data does not exist. The best data set available to cover the most countries and most international organisations, and with full-year coverage including 2022, was the OECD's dataset on contributions of a subset of countries to a large but not fully comprehensive set of multilateral organisations. South-South Cooperation would clearly also be worth capturing but data is typically not available on a global scale.

Detailed description & source

The amount of aid (ODA) directed by DAC countries to multilateral organisations was divided by GNI for DAC countries. This results in multilateral spending as a proportion of DAC GNI. This indicator's data follows a calendar year.

OECD DAC, 2023.

Indicator codes: 1010:I.OfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)(I.A+I.B);

2000:I.B.MultilateralOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(capitalsubscriptionsareincludedwithgrants)

Issued by: OECD.Stat

Updated: 2023-04-11

Available at: <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE5#>

Bounds

A combination of historical analysis and aspirational norm-setting was applied to build the bounds for this indicator. The historical analysis looked at how much funding had been spent in this way over the previous two decades to give an idea of the political and economic constraints DAC countries are working within. The aspirational norm-setting considered the proportion of respondents that would be required to have strong, versus weak, global solidarity, given the scale of global need.

| Lower bound (Very weak global solidarity) | Upper bound (Very strong global solidarity) |
|---|---|
| 0.06% | 0.18% |

Further explanation:

Reaching the upper bound for funding would imply nearly doubling the highest level ever reached, and on the assumption of a growing global economy, would deliver an ever-growing set of resources for collaboration. When added to bilateral, private, and other forms of collaborative funding, this would greatly enhance the world's ability to tackle cross-border crises. Future work intends to conduct an economic analysis of the level of multilateral funding required to effectively tackle cross-border crises, and if necessary recalibrate this upper bound accordingly.

Historical Minimum and Maximum Values

Since 2000, the minimum value recorded was in 2004, with DAC multilateral ODA spend representing 0.07% (actually 0.0664%) of DAC GNI. The maximum value recorded was in 2022, a value of 0.10% (actually 0.0996%).

Indicator 2b CONSENSUS IN DECISION-MAKING

Research question

How well are the countries of the world working together on issues of global importance?

Data point

Decisions at the United Nations (UN) agreed by consensus rather than going to vote (at the UN General Assembly) or veto (in the UN Security Council)

Rationale

A strong global community, working in solidarity, will tend to work cohesively on globally important issues. On the other hand, a global community close to breaking point is likely to spend its time in disagreement and hostility.

For a group to solve collective action problems, its members need to agree.¹ This also applies globally. For international organisations to function well, they need not only money, but also a clear sense of direction. That direction is provided most of all by national governments. There are many different types of agreement and cooperative action that governments may undertake, inside and outside the UN. This indicator by no means covers all of these, but it does provide a very useful gauge of whether countries are agreeing with each other more, or less, when it comes to solving international problems.

There are many scenarios in which the world's countries debate important issues and decide on ways forward, but none more so than the United Nations. Given the impossibility of gathering information from all the various global bodies, this indicator focuses on the two most important decision-making bodies at the UN. The UN General Assembly is where all the countries of the world debate and decide. The UN Security Council is a less representative body. It has been included in this indicator because it is so important for major global issues such as war and peace.

The measure of working together well at the UNGA is whether decisions have needed to be put to the vote rather than agreed in consensus. The measure of working together well at the UNSC is whether decisions have been vetoed rather than agreed in consensus. High levels of consensus in both bodies implies strong global solidarity.

Detailed description & source

The average of the proportion of total UNGA resolutions taken by consensus (as opposed to by vote) and the proportion of total UNSC resolutions taken by consensus (without veto). This indicator's data was collected on a July-June time frame to bring it as close to publication date as possible.

UN Security Council Resolutions

UN Security Council Meetings & Outcomes Tables in the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 2023.

¹ See note 12.

Issued by: Dag Hammarskjöld Library
Updated: 2023-08-31
Available at: <https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick>

UN Security Council Vetoes

Security Council Data - Vetoes Since 1946 in the UN Peace Security Data Hub
Dataset ID: DPPA-SCVETOES
Issued by: United Nations
Updated: 2023-08-31
Available at: <https://psdata.un.org/dataset/DPPA-SCVETOES>

UN General Assembly Resolutions, including votes

Voelsen D, Bochtler P and Majewski R. United Nations General Assembly Resolutions: Voting Data and Issue Categories. SWP - German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Data File Version 1.0.0. 2021. <https://doi.org/10.7802/2297>.

Voelsen et al's dataset was complemented with in-house data collection from August 2021 to present, using the following source:

UN General Assembly Resolutions Tables in the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 2023.
Issued by: Dag Hammarskjöld Library
Updated: 2023-08-31
Available at: <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick>

Bounds

Historical analysis was applied to build the bounds for this indicator. The historical analysis looked at the best and worst years for cohesive decision-making in the last two decades and set lower and upper bounds accordingly.bounds

Indicator 2c REPRESENTATION

Research question

Are the institutions that matter for our global community representative of their societies?

Data point

Average proportion of seats in national parliaments held by women

Rationale

This question matters for both equality and effectiveness. Gender is not the only measure of equality and representativeness. Other crucial areas are ethnicity, geography, sexuality, and disability. The focus on gender is a consequence of the availability of data. It is hoped that progress on women's rights is associated with progress on other issues of inclusiveness.

National parliaments are of great relevance to global solidarity. While global bodies are increasingly important, most major decisions still reside with national governments, of which parliaments are usually a crucial part. The representativeness of national bodies is a strong indicator of the representativeness of global bodies and other national institutions, including the private sector and other sectors.

Neither true solidarity, nor effective decision-making, are possible when excluding wide swathes of the population because of their gender, race, or identity.² While gender is not the only important measure of representation, it is a crucial one, and progress on gender representation in the world's most powerful political organisations is a useful gauge of institutional representation.

² Source: Cook NJ, Grillos T and Andersson KP. "Gender quotas increase the equality and effectiveness of climate policy interventions." Nature Climate Change. March 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0438-4>

Detailed description & source

The number of women as a proportion of the total representatives in national parliaments, as a world average. This indicator's data was collected on a July-June time frame to bring it as close to publication date as possible.

Inter-Parliamentary Union: Global and regional averages of women in national parliaments, August 2023.

Indicator code: Global and regional averages of women in national parliaments

Issued by: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)

Updated: 2023-08-31

Available at: <https://data.ipu.org/women-averages> (data up to 2018 inclusive can be found on IPU's archive site: <http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/world-arc.htm>)

Bounds

A combination of historical analysis and aspirational norm-setting was applied to build the bounds for this indicator. The historical analysis looked at trends in women's representation in national parliaments to give an idea of political constraints and possibilities. The aspirational norm-setting considered the level of representation expected for strong global solidarity.

| Lower bound (Very weak global solidarity) | Upper bound (Very strong global solidarity) |
|---|---|
| 20% | 40% |

Further explanation:

Ideally, the upper bound for strong global solidarity would be 50%, obviously. However, it is constrained by a political analysis based on reviewing historical data. While the lower bound is higher than historical data for the years before 2012, it is considered that any regression to those levels would indicate a very negative scenario akin to breaking point.

Historical Minimum and Maximum Values

On this scorecard, the minimum value recorded was in 2001, a value of 13.8% women in national parliaments. The maximum value recorded was in 2023, a value of 26.7%.

Indicator 2d TRADE VOLUMES

Research question

Are countries engaging with each other in a mutually beneficial way?

Data point

Exports of goods and services as a proportion of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Rationale

Trade is a strong measure of countries engaging fruitfully together. Of course, like all these indicators, it is imperfect. Often trade benefits one country more than another, and some sectors of society more than others. The type and terms of trade are crucial. Nevertheless, as a broad indicator, it implies the opposite of conflict, violent or otherwise, and trade sanctions are often the precursor or result of violent conflict. Indeed, it has often been said that the thick economic ties and interdependence of China and the US are the most powerful force preventing war between them.^{xiii}

What is the thickness of the web of private interactions that bind countries to each other? Trade volumes do not capture all of these interactions, but they are a powerful gauge of non-governmental cross-border cooperation.

Detailed description & source

Global weighted average of exports of goods and services as a proportion of GDP. This indicator's data follows a calendar year.

World Bank, 2023.

Indicator code: NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS

Issued by: World Development Indicators

Updated: 2023

Available at:

<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NE.CON.TOTL.ZS,NE.CON.GOVT.ZS,NE.CON.PRVT.ZS,NE.GDI.TOTL.ZS,NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS,NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS>

“Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments.” (World Bank, 2023.)

Bounds

A combination of historical analysis and aspirational norm-setting was applied to build the bounds for this indicator. The historical analysis looked at trends in trading volumes to give an idea of political constraints and possibilities. The aspirational norm-setting considered how much trade would be optimum in a strongly connected and successful global society, as against a world in which relationships between countries were breaking down.

| Lower bound (Very weak global solidarity) | Upper bound (Very strong global solidarity) |
|---|---|
| 22% | 34% |

Further explanation:

While the lower bound was almost reached in the first four years of this century, it is not claimed that this level of trade indicated global breakdown. Trade overall has risen in the past four decades not only because of greater global cohesion, but also because of the nature of the global economy and a focus on trade. The argument is that were the world to decline from current levels of trade to the low 20% in the years to come, that would likely signify a very substantial problem between countries.

Historical Minimum and Maximum Values

Since 2000, the minimum value recorded was in 2001, with global exports of goods and services representing 22.99% of world GDP. The maximum value recorded was in 2008, a value of 31.01%.

Impacts

Does public support and institutional strength add up to successes for people and planet? There must be some evidence that cooperation works, to maintain positive attitudes towards cooperation and support for global institutions. If it seems that nothing is working, public faith in institutions will eventually fall, further reducing positive impacts. The tight connection between faith in institutions and achieving positive impacts was demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic, where countries whose citizens had more faith in government on average suffered fewer deaths.^{xiii}

To measure progress in the outcomes of global cooperation, the 169 indicators of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are useful. They encapsulate those data points that all UN member states have agreed on as the most important measures of the progress they want to make, individually and in collaboration. Not all of the SDG indicators are easily measurable, not all of them relate to outcomes (rather, some relate to inputs, such as the availability of plans or financing), and not all of them truly relate to matters tending to cooperation between countries. Therefore we have selected indicators which are most measurable, outcome-oriented, and relevant. We have also striven to select headline indicators of the highest relevance, which cumulatively strike the right balance between different topics.

It should be noted that, notwithstanding the measurement of institutions focusing on ODA and intergovernmental bodies, the Scorecard is interested in international cooperation writ large. Therefore measures connected with economic growth and poverty reductions have been included, despite the fact that they are influenced by factors far beyond international development spending and programming. Economic development and poverty reduction are nevertheless strongly tied to global economic cooperation (and hampered by trade wars, sanctions and the unwinding of economic cooperation), and so they find their place in the Scorecard. Indeed it may be postulated that economic growth and poverty reduction are among the most important factors in boosting (or, when they fail, reducing) public confidence in cooperation across borders.

Indicator 3a HEALTH SECURITY

Research question

Are we getting closer to providing the world with basic health security to protect against pandemics and epidemics?

Data point

Global proportion of infants vaccinated with DTP3

Rationale

Health is one of the most high-profile and important cross-border challenges facing the world today, particularly after it was highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic. The risk of transmission across borders of infectious disease was made painfully clear. Rising to the challenge of health security is crucial for our species to thrive, and also implies high levels of global solidarity that will influence other areas where cooperation is required.

Vaccinations require a complex process of joint working and transnational supply chains, relying on a functioning global system of cooperation as well as strong national health systems. They are therefore good signifiers of international cooperation on health.

The most important system the world has for health security is the system by which vaccines are developed, manufactured, funded, and distributed so that they reach everyone. All four elements of the system are truly global efforts. And as the recent pandemic showed, the last one is the hardest.

The proportion of young children that has access to the most basic and important life-saving vaccines is a critical indicator, not only of our preparedness for the next pandemic, but also the level of solidarity we have mustered to ensure that children everywhere do not die from easily preventable diseases. The data selected here is a common reference point for experts in global health, and was recommended for use in this indicator.

Detailed description & source

The global proportion of infants surviving their first year of life who have received three doses of combined diphtheria, tetanus toxoid and pertussis-containing vaccine (DTP3) in a given year. This indicator uses the WHO's sum of WHO/UNICEF Estimates of National Immunization Coverage (WUENIC) by target population, where the size of the target population is the national annual number of infants surviving their first year of life. This indicator's data follows a calendar year.

World Health Organization, 2023.

Indicator code: DTP-containing vaccine, 3rd dose

Issued by: WHO/UNICEF Estimates of National Immunization Coverage (WUENIC)

Updated: July 2023

Available at:

<https://immunizationdata.who.int/pages/coverage/DTP.html?CODE=Global&ANTIGEN=DTPCV3&YEAR=>

Bounds

A combination of historical analysis and aspirational norm-setting was applied to build the bounds for this indicator. The historical analysis looked at trends in vaccination volumes to give an idea of constraints and possibilities. The aspirational norm-setting considered what level of vaccination globally would be optimum in a strongly connected and successful global society, as against a world in which relationships between countries were breaking down.

| Lower bound (Very weak global solidarity) | Upper bound (Very strong global solidarity) |
|---|---|
| 75% | 95% |

Further explanation:

Upper bound

While reaching 100% is unlikely, 95% is considered attainable.

Lower bound

While the lower bound was breached in the first four years of this century, it is not claimed that this level of vaccination indicated global breakdown. Vaccinations overall have risen in the past four decades. The argument is that were the world to decline from current levels of vaccinations to under 80% in the years to come, that would likely signify a very substantial breakdown in global solidarity.

Historical Minimum and Maximum Values

Since 2000, the minimum value recorded was in 2000 and 2002, a value of 72% of the world's infants vaccinated with DTP3. The maximum value recorded was in 2016-2019, a value of 86%.

Indicator 3b ENVIRONMENT

Research question

Are we reducing our negative impact on the natural environment?

Data point

Year-on-year reduction in global CO₂ emitted

Rationale

Of all the environmental threats, climate change is emblematic and related to all the others. Reducing CO₂ levels is the most important way to combat climate change. A reduction in CO₂ levels would also likely indicate strong cooperation on a range of other environmental indicators.

Global warming, climate change, biodiversity loss, and other environmental challenges are the main risk to human survival and wellbeing. If global solidarity is going to achieve anything, it must include a reduction in our hugely negative impact on the natural environment on which our survival depends. Of all the environmental threats, climate change and its consequences are the greatest. Reducing CO₂ levels is the most important way to combat climate change and would also likely indicate strong cooperation on other environmental indicators.

Detailed description & source

Annual change in global CO₂ emissions from energy combustion and industrial processes, in gigatonnes of CO₂. This indicator's data follows a calendar year.

International Energy Agency (IEA), 2023.

Issued by: IEA

Updated: 2023-03-02

Available at:

<https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/annual-change-in-global-co2-emissions-from-energy-combustion-and-industrial-processes-1900-2022>

Bounds

A combination of historical analysis and aspirational norm-setting was applied to build the bounds for this indicator. The historical analysis looked at trends in CO₂ emissions to give an idea of constraints and possibilities. The aspirational norm-setting considered what level of CO₂ reduction is required to achieve planetary health and human survival.

| Lower bound (Very weak global solidarity) | Upper bound (Very strong global solidarity) |
|---|---|
| +1 | -3 |

Further explanation:

Upper bound

The largest reduction in CO₂ emissions (from energy combustion and industrial processes) was in 2020, with an almost 2 Gt reduction. Reaching this is possible (even if it took a pandemic lockdown to help), but we need to go further. A 3 Gt reduction year on year is the aspiration.

Lower bound

While the lower bound was breached in seven years of this century, including 2021, radically reducing CO₂ is so important that the bound could not be lower.

Historical Minimum and Maximum Values

Since 2000, the minimum value recorded was in 2021, an increase of 2.19 Gt CO₂ on the previous year's emissions. The maximum value recorded was in 2020, a decrease of 1.94 Gt CO₂.

Indicator 3c VIOLENT CONFLICT

Research question

To what extent have tensions between peoples and countries evolved into violent conflict?

Data point

Total number of conflict deaths per 100,000 population

Rationale

Conflict results in deaths, injuries, forced displacement, and destruction of property. The number of deaths is a good indicator of the size of a conflict and whether it is a growing, reducing, or protracted conflict. Counting them as a proportion of global population allows for a growing population.

Conflict is the opposite of cooperation, and violent conflict is the most devastating situation for human society to find itself in. Whether between countries or between factions within a country, the international community has the duty to minimise conflict and the tragedy and destruction that comes with it. Each death is a tragedy, and the number of deaths is a good indicator of the size and nature of a conflict. Given the growing number of non-formal violent conflicts, this figure includes deaths in non-state violence and one-sided violence, as well as state-based violence.

Detailed description & source

Global number of conflict deaths per 100,000 population, including all three types of UCDP organised violence: state-based conflict, non-state conflict and one-sided violence. This indicator's data follows a calendar year.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 2023.

Dataset Code: UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 23.1

Issued by: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)

Updated: 2023

Available at: https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/index.html#ged_global

Davies, Shawn, Therese Pettersson & Magnus Öberg (2023). Organized violence 1989-2022 and the return of conflicts between states?. *Journal of Peace Research* 60(4).

Högbladh Stina, 2023, "UCDP GED Codebook version 23.1", Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.

Sundberg, Ralph and Erik Melander (2013) Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(4).

Bounds

A combination of historical analysis and aspirational norm-setting was applied to build the bounds for this indicator. The historical analysis looked at trends in conflict deaths to give an idea of constraints and possibilities. The aspirational norm-setting considered what level of death is acceptable in a coherent society, and what level leads to global breakdown.

| | |
|---|---|
| Lower bound (Very weak global solidarity) | Upper bound (Very strong global solidarity) |
|---|---|

| | |
|------|------|
| 2.30 | 0.30 |
|------|------|

Further explanation:

Upper bound

In 2005 there were only 0.30 conflict deaths per 100,000 people, the best score this century. The upper bound takes this best year as its pragmatic aspiration.

Lower bound

This year (2022 figures) is the worst year for conflict deaths this century, with 2.98 conflict deaths per 100,000 people. As such, it scores a negative score on this indicator, scoring outside the bounds set. While it is of course plausible to imagine a situation with many more conflict deaths, such as a major war, the bounds consider that anything approaching 2.30 conflict deaths per 100,000 people indicates a major breakdown of global solidarity.

Historical Minimum and Maximum Values

Since 2000, the minimum value recorded was in 2005, a value of 0.30 deaths per 100,000 population. The maximum value recorded was in 2022, a value of 2.99.

Indicator 3d ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE

Research question

Are the world's poorest countries gradually catching up or being left further behind?

Data point

Growth in Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) relative to High Income Countries (HICs)

Rationale

A community cannot survive if inequality is unbearable.^{xiv} A sustainably effective global community needs to ensure that the vast inequality that currently exists between and within countries is reduced over time. Reducing inequality is a signifier of growing solidarity. There are many measures of inequality and convergence, and it is possible for national economies to converge while the poorest in society get poorer (for instance, if in-country inequality increases). However, global responsibility, while extensive, is limited in its oversight of in-country inequality, so it is most appropriate to measure the gaps between countries.

A major constraint—as ever—was ensuring up-to-date and historical data. GNI per capita is not a perfect indicator, but generally speaking, it does lead over time to significant progress on key human development indicators,^{xv} as well as play a role in empowering countries in international negotiating scenarios.

Detailed description & source

The indicator was constructed by subtracting the annual GNI per capita growth rate (year x minus year x-1) of HICs from that of LDCs. This indicator's data follows a calendar year.

World Bank, 2023.

Indicator codes: NY.GNP.PCAP.CD (GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)) for both 'High income' and 'Least developed countries: UN classification'

Issued by: World Development Indicators

Updated: 2023

Available at:

<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL.AG.SRF.TOTL.K2.EN.POP.DNST.NY.GNP.ATLS.CD,NY.GNP.PCAP.CD,NY.GNP.MKTP.PP.CD,NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD,NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG,NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG#>

Bounds

A combination of historical analysis and aspirational norm-setting was applied to build the bounds for this indicator. The historical analysis looked at trends in to give an idea of constraints and possibilities. The aspirational norm-setting considered what level of convergence would be necessary for a coherent global society, and what level might lead to global breakdown.

| | |
|---|---|
| Lower bound (Very weak global solidarity) | Upper bound (Very strong global solidarity) |
| -2 | 10 |

Further explanation:

Upper bound

In the late 2000s, LDCs saw rates of growth as much as 11% faster than HICs, so that rate is certainly possible. The upper bound takes this rate as a basis.

Lower bound

HICs have grown faster than LDCs (or regressed slower) in only four years this century, which on this lower bound would take the world to the worst levels of solidarity on this indicator. Any increase in inequality between countries (i.e., a negative number) is considered this lower bound.

Historical Minimum and Maximum Values

On this scorecard, the minimum value recorded was in 2022, where LDCs' annual growth rate compared to the previous year was 4.90% lower than that of HICs, where growth rate is measured as GNI per capita. The maximum value recorded was in 2009, a value of 11.65% higher in LDCs than HICs.

A finger on the pulse

Measuring global solidarity is not simple, and we are indebted to the experts and advisors who have generously shared feedback on this scorecard and enriched its methodology. With only 11 indicators, and limited data available, this tool does not claim to capture all possible details or nuances of global solidarity. Instead, it provides a finger on the pulse of our evolving international community, with sufficient reliability for to enable informed action.

ⁱ Source: De Dreu CKW, Fariña A, Gross J and Romano A. "Prosociality as a foundation for intergroup conflict." *Current Opinion in Psychology*. April 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.09.002>

ⁱⁱ Policing of group norms provides benefits for all actors other than those who intend not to be cooperative, and has been shown in lab experiments to yield improved cooperative outcomes. Sources:

Ostrom E. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge University Press. 1990.

Tuomela R. *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View*. Oxford University Press. 2007.

Van Dijk E and De Dreu CKW. "Experimental Games and Social Decision Making." *Annual Review of Psychology*. October 2020.

<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-081420-110718>

ⁱⁱⁱ Kwame Anthony Appiah and Amartya Sen write about this. It is also demonstrated in surveys; for more detail, read this extract from Damluji H 2021, referencing findings from ISSP's 2013 survey: "A broad social survey of 45,000 people in various countries reveals that the majority (56 per cent) of those who 'agree strongly' that they are 'citizens of the world' are also 'very proud' of their country. By this measure, globalists displayed about the same level of patriotism as anti-globalists (of those who 'disagreed strongly' that they were 'citizens of the world', 58 per cent were 'very proud' of their country). The people who were least likely to be 'very proud' of their country were neither globalists nor anti-globalists but rather those who 'neither agreed nor disagreed' about global citizenship. Of them, only 35 per cent were 'very proud' of their country. This suggests that patriotism is not weakened by adding a layer of a globalist identity but rather by apathy about the world in general."

Sources:

Appiah KA. *Cosmopolitanism*. Penguin. 2007.

Damluji H. *The Responsible Globalist: What Citizens of the World Can Learn from Nationalism*. Penguin. 2021.

"International Social Survey Programme: National Identity III - ISSP 2013." ISSP Research Group. 2015. <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12312>

Sen A. *Identity and Violence*. Penguin. 2007.

^{iv} There is a growing body of psychologically-oriented work in the field of international relations (Kertzer and Tingley 2018), part of what has been described as a "new behavioural revolution" in political science (Hafner-Burton EM et al 2017). Literature on public attitudes to international cooperation has often focused on the European Union (such as Hale T and Koenig-Archibugi M 2016), including some work on the impact of crises (Hobolt S et al 2021). However, these questions are increasingly being asked of global governance (Tallberg J et al (eds.) 2018; Hale T and Koenig-Archibugi M 2019; Ghassim F et al 2022).

Sources:

- Kertzer JD and Tingley D. "Political Psychology in International Relations: Beyond the Paradigms." Annual Review of Political Science. February 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041916-020042>
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- Hale T and Koenig-Archibugi M. "Are Europeans Ready for a More Democratic European Union? New Evidence on Preference Heterogeneity, Polarisation and Crosscuttingness." European Journal of Political Research. February 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12136>
- Hobolt S, Popa SA, Van Der Brug W and Schmitt H. "The Brexit deterrent? How members state exit shapes public support for the European Union." European Union Politics. September 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165211032766>
- Tallberg J, Backstrand K and Scholte JA (eds.) *Legitimacy in Global Governance: Sources, Processes, and Consequences*. Oxford University Press. August 2018.
- Hale T and Koenig-Archibugi M. "Could Global Democracy Satisfy Diverse Policy Values? An Empirical Analysis." The Journal of Politics. 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1086/700106>
- Ghassim F, Koenig-Archibugi M and Cabrera L. "Public Opinion on Institutional Designs for the United Nations: An International Survey Experiment." International Studies Quarterly. September 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqac027>
- ^v A large body of social psychology research demonstrates that group membership is connected to greatly enhanced cooperative behaviour among humans (Romano A et al 2017a; Romano A et al 2017b) and reduced conflict (De Dreu et al 2020).
- Sources:
- Romano A, Balliet D and Wu J. "Unbounded indirect reciprocity: Is reputation-based cooperation bounded by group membership?" The Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. July 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.02.008>
- Romano A, Balliet D, Yamagishi T and Liu JH. "Parochial trust and cooperation across 17 societies." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. October 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.171292111>
- De Dreu CKW, Gross J, Farina A and Ma Y. "Group Cooperation, Carrying-Capacity Stress, and Intergroup Conflict." Trends in Cognitive Sciences. September 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.06.005>
- ^{vi} See note 3.
- ^{vii} Sources:
- "Global Citizenship A Growing Sentiment Among Citizens Of Emerging Economies: Global Poll." GlobeScan. 2016. <https://globescan.com/2016/04/27/global-citizenship-a-growing-sentiment-among-citizens-of-emerging-economies-global-poll/>
- "National Identity." International Social Survey Programme. <https://www.gesis.org/en/issp/modules/issp-modules-by-topic/national-identity>
- ^{viii} By definition, solving collective action problems requires individual sacrifices (Tuomela R 2007). Preparedness to make sacrifices for the good of the group has generally been identified by psychologists as the best way to overcome the risk that stated group membership is either meaningless (i.e. a "non-attitude" (Converse PE 1970)) or at least not sufficiently meaningful to lead to cooperative outcomes.
- Sources:
- Tuomela R. *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View*. Oxford University Press. 2007.
- Converse PE. "Attitudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue." In *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems*. Tuft ER (ed.) Addison-Wesley. 1970.
- ^{ix} See note 2.
- ^x Source: "National Identity." International Social Survey Programme. <https://www.gesis.org/en/issp/modules/issp-modules-by-topic/national-identity>
- ^{xi} Sources:
- Ostrom E. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge University Press. 1990.
- Tuomela R. *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View*. Oxford University Press. 2007.
- ^{xii} This argument goes back centuries. See for example Montesquieu (1750): "The natural effect of commerce is to bring about peace. Two nations which trade together, render themselves reciprocally dependent; if the one has an interest in buying and the other has an interest in selling; and all unions are based upon mutual needs." However, it has been challenged, for instance in Barbieri (2002).
- Sources:
- Montesquieu. *The Spirit of Laws*. 1750.
- Barbieri K. *The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?* University of Michigan Press. January 2002.
- ^{xiii} Source: Zaki BL, Nicoli F, Wayenberg E and Verschuere B. "In trust we trust: The impact of trust in government on excess mortality during the COVID-19 pandemic." Public Policy and Administration. January 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1177/09520767211058003>
- ^{xiv} Sources:
- Jetten J and Peters K. *The Social Psychology of Inequality*. Springer. 2019.
- Jetten J, Peters K and Salvador Casara BG. "Economic inequality and conspiracy theories." Current Opinion in Psychology. October 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101358>
- Larsen CA. *The Rise and Fall of Social Cohesion: The Construction and De-construction of Social Trust in the US, UK, Sweden and Denmark*. Oxford University Press. June 2013.
- ^{xv} Dollar D and Kraay A. *Growth is Good for the Poor*. September 2002. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020139631000>